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T h e
Preface.
The obj ;cr of this thesis is to nresont to the
most impo.etant act on the part of the donor in order that
he may convey good title to the person prope-ty which
he wishes the donee to have as his own.
Thle act referred to is the delivery of the subject
of the gift.
Title to pcisonal property, arising from transfer
by act of t:.e party may be acquired b, gift and by con-
tract.
A -C;ift is a voluntary transfer of property, but
without the consideratioi- which is an essential fe-tue
of a contract, and herein lies the distinction betvreen
pift and conti'act. in consequence of this aistinction,
the deliver-y of prorerty under gift is regralated by rules
applicable to itself alone. Acceptance is, of cou--se,
necessary to the copletion of every gift, and is en-
tirely optional with the beneficiary. it is supple-
mentary to, but not otherwise conncteu with aeliver'y.
While a gift re nains unexecuted, or' is not deliver'ed,
it cannot be enforcea in aii,%' court, because t'iere is no
consiaeration. j<elivei'y without the co-existence of
an intention to deliver is insufficient to pass title.
The situation, station, ani circumstances of the par-
ties, and the subject of the rift, may be ta-:er into
consider-ation in determining the intent to give and the
-act of delivery. T.ere words of gift are not suffic-
ient, but there must be a deliver'y, either actual or con-
strucive, in order that title may pass. It is not
enough to say"l give you a certain thing and then with-
hold it; for" a verbal gift without actual delivery trans-
fers no title. Any parol declaration of gift will
stand upon the footing of a mere pro ise to give; and,
to complte the transfel', acts and words should haron-
ize in establishing the intention to rive. Words of
future promise do not stand for' this purpose.
parol promise to pa> a sum of mone.y is a gift does not
bind the party making such promise, either in law or in
equity, not even to a trustee that he shall have the
properot which ie lolds in trust after the death of the
cestui que trust. However, on the ground of mutuality
voluntary subscriptions for charitable purposes are some
times enforced against the several subscriber-s; for
though each for hitiself merely promises to Five volun-
tarily, they are deemed to have signdc. relying upon the
promises of each other'. In the case of Watkins vs.
Eames, U Cushing, 53k, the defendant subscribed one
hunired dollars for the purpose of erecting a new meet-
ing house for the Congegational Society in the Town of
Fifteen hindred dollars were subscribed
T hu s a
Wuasiiingt on.
for and the contiract was let.
pay his subscription anu the plaintiff who was treas-
ure' of the society, brou;,ht suit against him, and
judgment was recovered on the grcound above stated.
Strict const-ruction long prevailed apainst the rule
allowing ha.,'rmonizinp -acts to suplle r.ont mere words of
gift and render eifori ffective. Grangiac vs. Arden, 10
Jolnson, 3, perhaps being the introtuctoiy case in fa-
vo-o o tL-e new rule. Here a fab,,,ev' purchas-ed a lottel-y
ticket and f:ave it to his eirht year old cL-u--hter" and
placed her narie on the bac': o) it, put it in his desk,
but subsequently was lost anu thus nevei' delivered.
i urew a p-'ize of five - ousana aolla-'s, 'vich money
he app'op±'ia ea to is owVn use, a when 1:e die-,, his
ctaugh~er was Illo,,ed to col.lect t!e o:.-,ount of tiho note
TVhe d een dan t re - is ed t o
,ith inzerust, on the f--ound t at the far,[.or Iica made
so many pi'evioaus e,.q).'essions of 'is int.entions tt,,at it
shaoulc be or was the childs money. Thi nccessit.,Y of
tarmonizing acts is sholwm in the case of Cai-penter vs.
iouqg.e, 20 Ver ,.ont, &6: The defendant conveyed a parcel
of land to his zcughter ano son-in-la:, t} e consioaer-
ation being four hundred dollars which was paid in a
note, and t',e defendant said th, t the note should go as
a gift to them. But he retained the note in his own
possession without '-,signmient o- other indication that
i- was d finitely set apart andm aplropriateu for her
benefit. The court lielc, that his son-in-law coiilrk not
compel the est ate to Jivo up t,,e note, beciause there ;[_s
no delivery.
When the subject of a gift is alLeaay in the pos-
6sessio'n of the donee, it is not necessary to i'e-deliver
the article. Thus if one borrows a book, an the owner
afterward says, "I make you a present of it," the bor-
row, r imay becie the n,w owner without havinp ever br'ouph;
the book back.
In the case of Winter vs. Wintei', 9 W. F., £247, the
owner of a boat., confined to his bed with sickness, told
the boatmaani-,who had its charge in custody. that he might
'-ave it for his own. Formal caelivery -1as hela unnec-
essai'y. Conversations anu geneiual condot recognizing
the gift here established a change of 7ossession, the
Law aispensing with all iale and useless formalities.
Corp{jreal chattels will in eener il pass by manual
uelivery, but wher'e the a rticles to be given a-'e bulky
or numerous ana not easily taken in hand, it may suif-
fice for the donor to point them out -enerully and allow
the donee to take thei!. intention is to be r'efarded
rather than formal procedure, and any clear expression
of the donor's willingness that the donee shall take the
property for his own will suffice, on his part, when tie
chattel is present an( in suitable condition for the
donee to avail himself of his opportunity. Bogan vs.
Finlay, La. Ann. 94; Allen vs. Cowan, 23 ,T. Y. 502;
Caldwell vs. Wilson, m Spear, Y5.
Lelivery may be either constructive or sym-bolical.
Real pIr'oei-ty was also the subject of Cift before the
feuu.l syrstem, ,-as abolishea. The transfer was effected
by the syibolical aelivery of a portion o the soil, *na
wass known as the process of livery of seisin. WI ien
the pro1 erty, fro. its peculiar nature or situation,
3does not admit of cor"por-eal Qelivery; as in ,_e cuse of
bulky articles or Foods stored 2.way,-- a aelivery of a
syumbol may suffice, if such delivery be otherwise con-
sistont with the o' iner' s intention to give. Thus, te
delivery of a key to a -,u]ne cell-ar ,ay amount to ue-
livering possession of the wines, because it is the way
of coming at the possession or to make sue of the thing;
in other words, such a deliVery is tantamount to actu -1
delivei-y for the rauumose of the gift. The delivery
of a receptacle, such as a desk, bureau or a trunk,
will pass the chat<el WitJ all i-s cont ,.nts, if such
appearis to h've bwn t! e giver-s in .ention. In cases
simple au -. bo- of je',ielriY o, a ,)urse o, money, deliv-
ery of the L,ox or purse cc .1u hardly fail to carr'y the
c n. ichene-r vs. Dale, 26 Pa. State, .contents. [;u t
the i'ale is not so readily applied where a symbol and a
ieceptacle a?-' involvea in the sam.,e -ift.
'iie aclivery of the key of a chest, ith woras
shuwing that the donor designed a constructive ,delivory
of the chest 'md all it contained, woijla entitle the
aonee to money, je;Jel'y, and other effects founa inside
of the chest. .. Ts vs. '1ller, 1 12. 1 300; Alle '-
ton vs. Lang, 10 Bosw. 362; Penfiola vs. Thayer, 2 :7. D.
S. :iti, 305; Cooper vs. Bu:-r, 45 barb. £ . in the case
last cited the plaintif h-I t'-Xen care of a ., io:-, T'or
twenty ..,ars, si:< of -;hich sihe was v; fi q: to he' bel,
t sia: ' eeks bo-oi~er .... ' ath , he saia, to 7 laintiff,
">zr y, he ar.- these keys; 1 _ve thm to you; tle'r
2.-e Lhe Z-eys Uf .i- y trunk an . bureau; tate ;hem aina eep
tA:e. , ana ta,:o Tc, cou care of tiem aia ai iy property
afl eoV.i/t, hiig 1 -'ive to ,ouU; you have been 'oo ;-ciu
to me and be so still.,, it was hold that ti'ie language
of the uonov, accompanieca by the Lelivery of thl'-,ey;s of'
the trunk ana burJeau, eveinced the intentiun of the .o-
nor, ana placed the a~nee in posscssion of the means of
as uaiin- absolute control of the contents at ier pleas-
ure, and constituted a valid r:ift of the coin and jew-
el"y in the trunk and bureau. And it w-;.s further held
that the fact that the trunk and bureau, or their con-
tents vere not removed, or even hanaled by the donee,
was not a contr-ollin'- consideration.
The rule aplears to be .'ell settled. that, wihen a
thin. itse;lf 1 ivht hI .ve been reaaily ia-LeLe over, theie
ca,, Loe no sufficient aelivery of another thiar' solely a S
its symbol or represent _tive, of a key, for instance,
in tihe place o an aoicle which- it unlocks.
Com. 440; W~va v. TuJ'n,r, 2 Vesey '. 443; Powell vs.
Hellicai, 6 Leav. 261. Ana wher' e ths auonor was at tlI
t],.,e o' the !ift incapable of inspectin s. check or
tiunk the r eneril rule is that the -elivei'y ozf a key
\iitrout other circumstances relative to the gift, or
4i',tout vwo'ds explanatory of intention, will not pass
title to the chattels contiAnea in the receptacle, part-
ly on account of the frauca which might result in the
uonor's ignorance of the cuntents. Tra.nsactions of
this kin2 are carefully scrutinized by the courts. In
the case Secor vs. Ellis, 3 hi-Ci. , Judge C- mpbell lays
uown the rule, that where a per'son does all that he can
do unie-r he circumstances to effect a celivery of a
gift the title wiill pass, but this case is criticised
n t ' s
and expres.ly ovinr'led Ii Yong vs. 0 ! ) York, 443.
Constructive deliver.'i i. often necrssau'-/ to val-
idate a for,-ivenes.,-3- clect. in the case of Darland
.Io"a, A", the plaintiffs were adinis-
trA.tcrs of the esta'te of Alsey Iarland, who was grand-
±oter_ =-f the drfendant. T'is grandson becar-,e the own-
or- of L. Parcel of lanm conveyeu to 'iim re, the consid-
el'ation of sixteen hundred aollLws, one thousand of
ai- ichi was allowed for the care of his mother -rirg her
life, :ni four Iunl-ed -'. an fifty a, liars was p-ai in
cash, the r'est b, a note xijichi the de-ceased rI-.ased -o
taae, but after--a ds i, so an-[l destroyeu it saUing
she aia not -imrit i I m to pay then. -,'he cour-,t hclu this
to be : valii. -elivery and cancellation of the debt.
in th case of Styong vs. Li-ra, Law I-e,,. 13 q.
Cases 61b, E ' s s t.epmothe r lived jith 'iiii, and Dpaid ti'io
Lunui'e pounds per quaiter for board nu lodiinpw. B
boI"'oveu eleven hundred pounds of h,.r, an, it was agr-e u,
that, the loans should be iepaid by quarteoiy deductions
of a liu nured p1,unds f':, the sun paid for board. De-
auctions , ,.e ,ade accovair-iily for t e first two quar-
ters, after ' llich the step-mother' refused to make fur-
' , uartcrly, for fo -ic
ner d...uctions, and paid in fill a
eams, uf er' lIich she died, leavinE, L. her executor.
I .as ield that r' s aebt was released at law by his ap-
pointi.cn as executor; also that the intention to ive
L. nine hund-ed u.r.s ,s completed by her' payment of
nine iostall sf nlS0 :iunaed poulit, s e-ach.
Tie case of Cray vs. Lai'von, J" )e, Yolk, CM, was
an action to r-ecover -he balance of an accutmt. The
defondant proved that tie plaintiff had roceibed f i (m
hir'i one aullar, ana bal--Mc Ld the account by an ent,-T,
";ift to ba lnce account, ianu ilad Civon hiM a r< ceipt
for one aolla in full to balance all book accounts.
It ,,.,as lela that this transaction though not good as
an accora and satisfaction, was --ood as gift, and t1-at
the plaintiff coula not recover'.
The foregoing ral s apply to te delivery of all
gifts irrespective of kind, ana ar-e the most important
of the general i-ules. hlowever', gifts are divided into
tw ,i classes, under each of which Zhe *.elivery of the
saiae alticle, or class of articles, ;ay be the subject
cC aistinct oi sp,. ci-l rules. Por' a full 'nuerstand-
ing of 'ese rul s, exact -nu distinguishing definitions
of the classes are useful.
Gifts int)' vivos, of sii iple gifts are suciL as one
party makes u nother without the expectation of' ap-
pivo:Lchinr: dea-th as the ovin- cause. 2 Kent's Coi.i. /
And since the mutual intention ol" t:he pirtius to such a
I-ift is propei'ly carries out at once upon delivery and
acceptance, or equivalent acts, the transfer will tak<e
place absolutely an irrevocably as tie executecd act of
the pa:ties upon the due observance cf the requisite
forimal itie s. Gifts inter vivos are co,,i'only made when
the givei- is in his o',.inai'y good health; but this need
not be, for however' piecurious might be the actual
chances of prolongera e-Xistence, it is only when death
Sappears immnent, and the prospect of losing forever
his holu upon his pcopery leaa the giver to decide that
he will bestow a tliing: in a pa,'icul. man~er, that the
law[ deems the -ifat he makes other than one inter vivos.
All gifts r-if-, s are inter vivos except those causa ,ior-
UiS.
J,stinian, in Jds Institutes, uescribes the danatio
mortis causa or f-ift causa r ,ortis as a wish of the donor
that tl~e thin, given should belonEv to himself rather
zhan to the pei son to whom he gives it, and to hat per-
son 1'ather than to his own heirs.
in the ca--e of Liicholas vs. Adams, 2 WVharton, 17,
it wa"s hel not to be indispensible to a valid gift
causa mortis that it sho1ul be made in extre ,,is like a
nuncupative will. The Chie ' Justice defined it to be
a cnitional Vift do euinrg on a contingency of expect-
ant death, undL that. it was aiefeasi!Ole by revocation or
deliver 'ce from the peril. Tl-.e circ-.I-, stances ri-ust be
oucl, as to show that the donor intendea the gift to
take effect if 1ie should die shortl',y aftev'ards, but that
if he should recover the thing should be restored to
him. If p-conerJly i ade a gift causa mortis is valid,
notwithst-naing a previous will. K'ent's Com. 444.
A rjft cannot be both inter vivos and causa -ortis.
0f~en persons aesire to maike gifts ,vhich combine the
qualities of a gift caua mortis and a gift inter vivos
at one an'a the same tiiie.
The uv:tter of T"rough's Estate, 30 Pa. State, 115,
illus-rat,-s this proposition
insurance, Lein[. solvant.
Troug'h effectea a life
In consideration of one dol-
lar ana love and affection for his chiluoen, he executed
nmder seal an assig-nment of the policy to one -lic ks,
in tr~st for t~er , -ut The policy ana ass inment into
an envelope and aucrresseul it, "John W. flicks, T2 c.
Please send thiis to him at my deat'i. H. Trough, " and
-Placo the envelope in a safe of his own fic' 1 . He paid
the pre.iurns till his death seven years after the as-
sign>ent, but never coamnunicated the transaction, to
ficks, who never' knew of it till after his oeath.
It was :nlU th.t the as i-nt.-ent ',las invalid for '.ant
uf e I iv vy.
The case of Zi u er 1 &n vs. Streeper, -'/ Pa. State
14_7 is si ilr. Streeper ;,h. hel, a bond ai'."st Zil,-
',er:_-an, enuorseU on it, "irequ;-st my executoi's to E:ive
this bod to Anna foc iier 5r,:±,a' kindness she hs shown to
i.e and her gr'nd: ,otho. " -is .;as simned ana sealed,
.fter it ", as wcii .en, t7i his is not to intel-f:- ' 3 witli
what I will to 1,; ihis she is to have bsicws that."
Anna was grand-daagiter of the .bligee an. v,'i ' of the
obl i ,or. The bond was not uelive'ed to Anna bat le-
iainecL in the obligoi's possession with his other se-
Ou-rities till hiiis deqtn.
loti not pass to Anna.
I2. was helot that -he bonc.
Tec enctorsement indicated a pro-
spective Li'L, but as there .as no delive',,, it was
,vithout o er :tion. Lacking th e reqAisite statute for-
t:ialities, such <teampted dispositions cannot operate as
b e u s % s. Thev ar"e not v;liO as -ifts inter vivos be-
cause to these gifts deliv'e y in .raesenti is essential.
Neither can :1le, be reaided as gifts catLsa mortis not
beinig tmrade in i,,mediate expectation of death. Aiad so
,_ie own r's intention "ails because he has con_',,se- ",ne
classes of gifts.
In the ca,e of a gift inteir vivos if the tiuine be
not cm)ablo o- actual delivery, there must be sCALe acts
equivalent to it. The dknor mlest part not only v,,iti the
posscssion but wvith tl~e du.....on of tic, ,ro prty.
The case of Young vs. Young, 8 U,: w York, " $, is a
leading ancillustrative case. In this case a father
Saving two sons desired to p:ive theiyi some bonds which
he owned, and to reserve the: interest o- them daiing
his life. The fat-, er owned a safe w i-i he afterward
gave to his son, in which he kept all his papers in one
part and jiis son kept his in another p_- rt. lie told the
sons of .his gift to them and the son placed Then in the
safe among his papers, although in The control of the
fater also, who often tore off the couv'ns and col-
lected the inoei'est. Thie couirt held than .his ,-.s not
a valid Uelive'y, since ,he fathe., could always get at
them. It was -iso held that equity viould not inter'-
,3eie to perfect an impe,-fect -iift b: caoclcinf- a trust
in favor, uf the donee.
in oe; Y r'k, a series of just ana equitable de-
cisions support a tr.st for a donee in the case of bank
. eposits made by way of gift by he donor in the name
uf the donee. In the case of :artin vs. Funk, '5 ew
(ork, lI, is the first to establish the rule.
'e Posite in a Savings bank a s'ivi of.money belonging
to her, aeclarinr' at the time that she .ianted the account
to be in trust for plaintiff. The account was so en-
terou and a pass book given to S. containing an entr,,
in obastai±co, that the account was Jith her in triust
§or nlaintiff.
trust for K.
A trst was made in the sate manner in
Plaintiff and . veie sister's, ana -is-
S., retained possession of the
pass books, and the money ±'emainea in the bank iwith its
accumulateQ inteirest, except that she dr-ew out one
,ear's interest,until her aeath. Plaintiff and K.
were ignorant of The deposits until after that event.
In an action to obtain ,,ossession of the pass books, and
to recover the aeposits, it was held that the transac-
tion was a valid and sufficient declaration of trust
and passe,_ the title to the doposits, S. constituting
herslef a trust-'e; that the I'etention of the pass books,
which wer'e simply the voucher's for the property, must
be aeened to have been held as trustee, and was not in-
consistent with the coimileteness of the gift, nor was
notice to the cestui que trust necessary. This case is
followed in Larker vs. }larbeck, which is a late case re-
rant relative.s of S.
por-ted in the New York ', tate R eport'er, (78, where the
defeindant's testatrix deposited a sum of money in a
Savings Lank for HIenrietta Bavker. Ieve±-al years
e-eafter, sai testatrix drew it out and applied it
to hLer own use. ield, that testatrix cither deposited
.ienvietta larker's money, or by such aeposit consti-
tuteci heu.self a trustee of the fund by a completed
LiLt of the money deposited, and that when she drew it
out she xheld it as trustee, and that the personal rep-
rosentatives of -enrietta Parker were entitled to re-
cover said sum from the estate of testatrix. The
same rule was declare, in a leter case in thO ixatter of
Crawford, reported in 113 I1ew yurk, S 9 0, which was de-
cided as late as in June, 13O9.
in the came of carunel vs. £ ei'-'itt, 62 .aryland,
7T, a grandmother, from time to time, duving a pei od
of Live years, deposited various snms of money in the
..)avin,vs Eank of ]ialtifore, to tL d
chilaren, the accounts in the bank beinp- in tiie name
of each, as a minor, anc. t>.e deposits m:de sabject to
her order, o.' that of her daughter. She also kept an
account in the bank in her ownii naree, the deposits beinrr
subject to like order. About the time the grandi.mother
began to --'e tse deposits to the credit of her gran u-
children, she CCclared that, "she ,ias goin! to put the
money in the ba.<nk for the chilcra.en. " Shortly after
her death the -aughter drew out this money and adxin-
isterod it as a part of the estate of rer motier.
Upon a bill filed in the numve of t1e Fr nu- hildren
arainst the daughter to obtain an accoun- of the moneys
so withdrawn by her, it was held, that the moneys depos.
ited by the grandmother ucer'e perf cted gifts, whic'i she
'au no dosign to countermand; ana that the donees were
entitled to the several arno nt which stood to ;1hcir
credit in the benk, when withdrawn by the d.fendant,
with interest thereon from the (date of thie .,ithdrau.iel.
The i'.le is meritorious, and will pv'obably become
thie law in all countvies.
If in the case of a gify inter. vivos, the thiing
given be a chose in action, the law iequices an assign-
erant or come equivalent instrument, and the transfer
must be actually executed. 2 7 1nt's Com. 4-t.
it. has be n Ihc'ld that a certificate of bank stock
transferable in terms, at the U <nk onl:r, peison or by
attor.ney, is n t filly bestowed as gift when delivered
Thus,
endor-sod in blank by the -unoi,; nor indeed sufficient-
ly to entitle The donee -o a transcr of the stock as
a-ains., the donor' s executo'. Penrinpton vs. Cittings,
Ape's ,ise never "exrfo ,med, to exc-
cute an assi -:nt:ient, .cannot be a g ift by assi<nnunt.
L1o)' is a gift of privileges to subscr ibe new stock ef-
fectual while the script is neither issued nor the price
p aycble. Egerton vs. Egerton, 1'7 ! ew Jersey Eq. 4-1.
Ana since the debt repv:esenteud b ,T twe note is the
.rincipai thing in a mortp-ape ti'ansacticn, whiile the se-
curity is only -ucessoi-y, the deliveoiy of a vortgage
ueea auly assignea is held to carry no title by way of
ift, notwithstanding the giwrvr's inte-ntiun, unless the
note was aeliVcred likewise. Vilson vs. Carpenter, 17
An, from t Iis it aVulc_ appear that
2 Gill &"' J. )03.
1WTi sconsin, o1l2.
the promissory note o) thii.ci pei-son secured by a rnoi't-
Sa-e, if pI'opev'ly deliveried, cari>- is, constructively,
the mortgage deed thouu-h in ,he 'ossessiun of Cionoi" at
his dea-h. On the e 0he--' hana, the gift of a note pay-
able to bearier, when suitaLly endorsed will doubtless
be gooa when te instrument is delivered in that c ndi-
zion; of stock, when the tivansf r is completed; of in-
coipoi'_ral chattels, vihich pass by simple aelivery, like
bank notes and lottery tickets, upon the mere delivery
of the thing; of tiosos recfairing a- ass-, ien , upon
delivery of the assi-7nent; in suot, \'-en all has been
aone vwhich satisfies:;he la.:al requi-ei:-ents of ti-ansFer,
ana tie in-ernticn of mnaking a gift appeairs to have been
f~ally exec~t D.o Ana TG.is is orue f the donor's owvn
obligation, .ihich is t .e opinion of ',,ilde, J. , in G -ovur
Vandusen vs. Rawley, 4 Seld.
oOSu; Bedell vs. Ca'll, 36 Eevi Yovk, b01; Lemon vs. Phoe-
nix lutual Life iris. Co. , 30 Conn. 264.
Eut in the case of a gift causa mortis, an appo-
si1e -ule 1 revails. Any bona not the donor's own obli-
gation may be the subject of a rift causa morris by d ,-
livery of the instrumient with or without assigniment in
-riting, and notwithstanding the non-existence of full
formalities. Ana this is also true of a note.
law was not always thus, and the old cases were express-
ly overualed in Duffielu vs. Lewes, decided by Lord El-
don in 127. 1 Bigh. (N.S. 497). Upon the princi-
ple therein set for'th, gifts causa mortis of bills of
2xc~iange, proris:or: notes, ce'tificates of ae;ocsit,
coupon bonds aria negotiable instruments generally, are
The
Vs. Grovel') 24 Pick. 2 3I.
now u1ielu arriost universally in Enlan and A,.erica,
oven without an endorsement, provid'.d only that the in-
str'jent i bselir be uelivej'ud to the uoree or some one
in his behalf with the suitable intention of transfer.
Ashbrook vs. Ryan, 2 is . , 220; Lates vs. 1'erpton, /
Gray, 3C$2; Vesterloo vs. do Witt, 36 New York, 340.
As xias saia by Chief Justice Shaw in Paris vs. Stone,
14 Pickering, lc S, "These cases all go on the as,- u- p-
tion that a bond, note or other security is a valid sub.
sisting obligation for' the 'aint of a suon of .oney,
and the -ift is ir) effect a ift of money, by a fift
and delivery of the instrument that shows its existence
and a.Uoras the rians of reducing i to pessession,"
Lut save where th donoir means to fo:egivo the uonee his
ebt, such gifts must be confined uo obligations of a
30
thirca party, and thus the limit is placed to gifts cau-
sa moi'tis of incorporeal chattels that the uonoi-'s owm
pr'omise, w1)2t1' in the shape of pro issory note, un-
accepted bill, or contract genec': lly given in the pros-
pect of approaching death and only to take effect at
or after his deai-i is not a valid gift causa mortis.
For the practical rosilt of sustainiEg- such an execu-
tory conti'act woula be to enable a dyin: man to make in-
forvial caisrositi ,ns of his estate by c. ea ,in- in favor
of his friends at pleasure, debts, ,ithout a silauow of
consideration to uphold them. Flint vs. Patteo, 33 New
lauipshire, b20; Paris vs. Stone,14 Picketing, 198; E-ay-
[-ond vs. Sellick, 10 Conn. 40; Starr vs. Starr, 9 )ouio
3tate 74; Iarris vs. Cla-rke, 3 Comstock 3.
case overrules W ight vs. Wlir-ht, Cow. b "'.
The last
ils to gifts inter vivos, cilivery of the subject
of the gift to a pe'son as agent of a donor is not f-Ood
deliver'y to the donee, and thus questions often arise as
to iv-,ether the person to w hoi, de liver:< is made, is the
agent of the donor or, the donee, ana as to whether or-
not the authoi-ity to6 the ant to deliver is revoked at
death of donor; or whether the agent's aul-.hority is a
power coaplea with an inzeres., so as to be irrevocable.
The true rule is tha. if the ..i.. party to whoi-
delivery i.s made is striczly the agent of the Uconor and
does riot ,-reviously complete tfhe transfer of the gift,
it is invalidated by the dea- . of tiae donor; but the
presumptiorn is in favor' of the donee. The "arencv for
a donor' terminates at his teath, because it is not an
intei-,.. st coupled uith a .. . h'Cho dii 'ections, "take
the money and uelivei, to the donee, " cunstitu:es a good
ailivery because Li, donoi' i-clinljUi]Q hes all -ight to
le thing: elivei'aid to the agtynt of the donee, an de-
liviy to the -.gent constiutes a aelivei'y to the aoneo.
Tiie acceptance i2 alvways impliec, J- it is foi the ben-
efit oi the aonee. In an agency fo ' lae donor the
'il:ht of -'evocation remains in t-L -onor until the aeliv-
ry is co.mleted.
in th- case of rif.ts causa iJol-iS, he Piesunp-
-iun is in favor of suci third party being: n a-n :L the
donee becomes a settled fact and beyc,-. qu istion, fo:-
the g ift beinr' necessarilyr ,-,ade in expectation of death,
,iis5 exclu,-..s all inference hat, the agF ,cy wjas foi, the
aonor anu to terminate at his d~atL. in other- espete,
the law of renc7 is nL 'a ..- by thie natu-e of the gift.
'Phe writer's attention in the course of his inves-
ti[ation of this subject has been frequently attracted
by numerous and interesting decisions on the validity
of 7ifts whei'e the insolvency of a donor enters into
the questiorl, or whe!'e t'ie parties sustain a conficen-
tial relation to each other. but this applies to the
effect of a delivery only, and is omitted,since the in-
tention of the writer -vhs been to confine this .Liscourse
to the manner of fortii of the caelivery. Also many in-
LLiviuual cases which seem of necessity to foyn a rule
of the,-selves.
In conclusion it is hoped that the writer has con-
veyed to the learneu reader the must ii-i-oirtant rules
relating to the d-livery of a ['il't; to thiiu persons as
aEents of the donor or the donee, in both inter vivos
and causa mortis. Al-, as to xiiat aMoults to Uelive.y
actual or constructive, ',"it! the uistinfuishinr t+cs
of each.
